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THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE CONSTITUTION
By C. PiERRY PATTERSON*
"The preservation of the Federal Constitution is all we need
contend for."-Jefferson
"Our national Constitution, the ark of our safety, and grand
palladium of our peace and happiness."-Jefferson
It has been said that "the Reformation substituted an infallible
Bible for an infallible Pope and the American Revolution a Con-
stitution for a King." In each instance, a document, in the one a
divine law and in the other a fundamental law, had displaced an
absolute ruler-a government of law in both religion and politics
had superseded a government of man. These were tremendous
and significant changes in the interest and freedom of the individual
in both religion and politics. There remained, however, one im-
portant matter-what was the meaning of the document?
Many of the forefathers realized that the establishment of a
government of law involved much more than merely drafting and
adopting a constitution for its basis. Some even doubted that a
fundamental law could be maintained or that a government of law
could supersede a government of man. John Francis Mercer, a
delegate to the Federal Convention from Maryland, said on the
floor of the Convention: "It is a great mistake to suppose that the
paper we prepare will govern the United States. It is the men
whom it will bring into the government and interest in maintaining
it that is to govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode
and the form. Men are the substance and must do the business."'
Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying convention said: "It is not
on that paper before you we have to rely should it be received; it is
those who may be appointed under it. It will be an empire of men,
and not of laws."2 While the Constitution was being considered
for adoption, a friend said to Gouverneur Morris, "You have given
us a good Constitution." "That depends," said Morris, "on how it
is construed."3
It is clear from these quotations as well as from reason that the
chief problem in maintaining a fundamental law is that of inter-
*Professor of Government, The University of Texas.
IMax Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, II, 289.
-Elliott's Debates, 3, 577. All italics in the text were supplied by the
writer of this article.
3Quoted by Edward S. Corwin, Court Over the Constitution, (1938) 228.
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pretation. Bishop Hoadly in the seventeenth century said: "Who-
ever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken
laws, it is He who is truly the Law-Giver to all intents and pur-
poses, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."'4 Justice
Holmes maintained that a judicial decision involves at every step
"the sovereign prerogative of choice."5 Chief Justice Stone while
Associate Justice said: "While unconstitutional exercise of power, by
the executive and legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check on our exercise of power is our own sense of self-
restraint."6 Here is asserted the supremacy of the Court to exercise
constituent powers. Justice Frankfurter prior to his appointment
to the Court, speaking of the respective roles of national control
and state authority, said: "The words of the Constitution on which
their solution is based are so unrestrained by their intrinsic mean-
ing, or by their history, or by tradition, or by prior decisions, that
they leave the individual justice free, if indeed they do not compel
him to gather meaning not from reading the Constitution but from
reading life."7 He further referred to "the neutral language of the
Constitution.""
In view of the apprehensions of the forefathers as to the prob-
lem of maintaining a fundamental law and in the light of the history
of more than a century and a half of loose construction of the Con-
stitution, with the exception of the period from the late thirties to
the early sixties covered by the Andrew Jackson Court, ending in
complete uncertainty as to the meaning of the Constitution-a
document of neutrality, we are in a more favorable position than
ever before to evaluate Jefferson's constitutional principles.
The Establishment of Fundamental Law
The doctrine of a fundamental law was a basic principle in the
American Revolution. The first problem facing the forefathers, fol-
lowing the Revolution, was the establishment of fundamental laws
for their state constitutions. Jefferson made the greatest contribu-
tion to the solution of this problem. In the first place, he announced
in the Declaration of Independence the basis of a fundamental law
when he said that governments derive "their just powers from the
consent of the governed." Here is the announcement of the doctrine
4Quoted by J. C. Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law, (1921).5Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, (1934) 115.
OUnited States v. Butler, (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed.477. 4 Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court, (1927) 309.
lbid., 310.
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of popular sovereignty-the basis of a fundamental law which is
differentiated from statutory law by being an extraordinary en-
actment of the people in their original sovereignty. It is this basic
fact that gives it supremacy over the acts of government and makes
government the mere agent of the sovereign will.
There remained the problem of actually establishing a funda-
mental law. It was obvious that the making of such a law could not
be done by a legislative body because the creator is superior to the
creature. Such a process would mean legislative supremacy and
not constitutional supremacy. New machinery and processes sepa-
rate and distinct from legislative or governmental control would
have to be devised for this task. History furnished no precedent.
Heretofore governments had been established by force and in
no instance were their foundations rested upon "the consent of the
governed."
The solution of this problem was a prerequisite of a govern-
ment based on a fundamental law and the establishment of a
limited state, and produced possibly our greatest contribution to
constitutional government-the state constitutional convention
which became the agent of original sovereignty in proposing our
state constitutions and in ratifying the Constitution of the United
States. It was by this means that governments limited by a funda-
mental law were established in this country by the quiet delibera-
tion of free men-a much more challenging spectacle in the history
of liberty than the forcing of a drunken King to sign Magna
Charta at Runnymede by the Barons of England in 1215, though
both events had for their purpose the establishment of a govern-
ment of law.
Jefferson was among the first if not the first to realize the sig-
nificance of the state constitutional convention as a part of the
process of establishing a fundamental law and a limited govern-
ment. The purpose of this process was to abolish legislative or
executive supremacy and to establish the supremacy of a funda-
mental law maintained by judicial review. Jefferson had no con-
fidence in either legislatures or executives.
The first constitution of Virginia was framed and adopted June
29, 1776, before the Declaration of Independence was issued, by a
rump session composed of forty-five members of the colonial House
of Burgesses without any commission from the people and without
referring their proposal to the people for ratification.3 In other
9Ben Perley Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, (2nd Ed.,
1878) II, 1910.
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words, a part of one of the Houses of the Virginia legislature
assumed and exercised the power of adopting a constitution for
Virginia, thus providing for legislative supremacy. Jefferson
vigorously attacked this assumption of power, contending that
despite the fact that the document called itself a constitution and
even provided for the separation of powers, it was not a funda-
mental law and, therefore, provided for legislative supremacy be-
cause the same authority that made it could change it. Here Jeffer-
son contends that a legislative body is not the proper body to adopt
a constitution. "It is not the name," he said, " but the authority
that renders an act obligatory."' 10 A constitution or a fundamental
law, he said, is not a mere matter of name or form, but of substance.
It must be the act of the sovereign people to make it "obligatory."
By obligatory, he meant supreme. "The other states in the Union,"
said Jefferson, "have been of the opinion that to render a form of
government unalterable by ordinary acts of assembly, the people
must delegate persons with special powers. They have accordingly
chosen special conventions to form and fix their governments."'
"A constitution," he said, "must be an act above the power of the
ordinary legislature," otherwise, "there is no legal obstacle to the
assumption by the assembly of all the powers legislative, executive,
and judicial." 2 Here Jefferson maintains that only a fundamental
law will furnish "a legal obstacle" to the assumption of supremacy
by the legislative body. By "legal obstacle" he means judicial
review.
In the summer of 1783 it was expected that a constitutional
convention would meet in Virginia with special powers delegated
to it to draft and adopt a constitution. While the convention did not
meet, Jefferson drafted a fundamental constitution to be submitted
to it. Jefferson stated that the purpose of the convention was
"'to form a constitution for them, and to declare those fundanientals
to which all our laws present and future shall be subordinate."13 In
other words, a fundamental constitution was to be substituted for
the legislative-made constitution of 1776, and it was to be supreme
over legislative acts.
In the constitution which Jefferson proposed is found the
following specific negation on legislative supremacy: "The general
assembly shall not have power to infringe this constitution .... ,,14
loWritings' (Library Ed.) II, 169.
"Ibid., 11, 171.
12Ibid., II, 173.
"3Ibid., II, 282-283.
14Ibid., II, 287.
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There are several absolute prohibitions on the legislature in his
proposal. He refers to laws "not inconsistent with this constitu-
tion."1 He further states "that a convention is necessary for alter-
ing this constitution."'6 Here Jefferson proposed a fundamental law
for Virginia by means of a constitutional convention, that it shall
be altered and amended by the same means, and that "a legal
obstacle" or judicial review shall prevent its destruction. In these
statements of Jefferson is found the complete foundation of Ameri-
can constitutional law made a decade prior to the establishment of
our present Constitution.
Judicial Reziew as the leans of Harmonizing the Federal System
Not only was Jefferson the first to contend that the state con-
stitution should be a fundamental law and that judicial review should
be used to preserve it, but he was among the first, if not the first,
to see that judicial review was the proper means of preserving
federalism. The Virginia proposal for our present Constitution sug-
gested that Congress be given the power to repeal the acts of the
states controvening the Articles of Union.17
Jefferson was in Paris during the time the Federal Convention
was sitting, and on receiving a copy of the Virginia proposal from
Madison, he immediately replied June 20, 1787, saying: "The nega-
tive proposed to be given them (the Congress) on all the acts of
the several legislatures, is now for the first time, suggested to my
mind. Primia facie, I do not like it. It fails in an essential character;
that the hole and the patch should be commevsurate. But this pro-
poses to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment. Not
more than one out of one hundred state acts concern the confed-
eracy. This proposition, then, in order to give them one degree of
power, which they (the Congress) ought to have, gives them
ninety-nine more, which they ought not to have, upon the pre-
sumption that they will not exercise the ninety-nine. But upon
every act, there will be a preliminary question. Does this act con-
cern the confederacy? And was there ever a proposition so plain,
as to pass Congress without debate? Their decisions are almost
always wise; they are like pure metal. But you know of how much
dross this is the result."""
The substance of Jefferson's objection is that the danger and
1:lbid., II, 299.16Ibid., II, 298.
17Farrand, op. cit., I, 28.8',Vritings (Library Ed.) VI, 132.
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the remedy are not co-extant. The remedy is not restricted to the
evil. To give Congress the power to repeal one act of a state
legislature, it is necessary to give it the power to repeal all the
acts of all the state legislatures contravening the Articles of Union
in order to establish the principle and in the end the principle be-
comes that of congressional supremacy over the states limited only
by its discretion. In principle and law a unitary republic would be
established but Congress might suffer the provinces to have such
autonomy as it saw fit.
What was Jefferson's solution? "Would not an appeal," he
asked, "from the state judicature to a federal court, in all cases
where the act of confederation controlled the question, be as
effecttal a remedy, and exactly commensurate to the defect:-?'
What does this suggestion of Jefferson's mean? At least four
significant matters are involved. First, that judicial review by both
state and federal courts be substituted for congressional supremacy
as the means of maintaining the act of confederation, meaning, of
course, the constitution. Second, that this review be restricted to
actual cases involving the act of confederation, or as we say, a
federal question. Thirdly, that this review should first be exercised
by the state courts, and fourthly, that in case the state courts sus-
tained unconstitutional state legislation an appeal to federal courts
would give an opportunity for reversal of such decisions. So far
as I have been able to discover from the writings of the forefathers
this was the first time judicial review restricted to actual cases in-
volving federal questions was suggested as the proper means of
preserving the federal principle. It was proposed as a means of
coercing the states but only in accordance with the constitution.
Its main object was to protect the states from congressional
supremacy.
Jefferson gave an illustration of how his proposal would work.
"A British creditor, for example, sues for his debt in Virginia; the
defendant pleads an act of the state excluding him from their courts;
the plaintiff urges the confederation and the treaty made under that,
as controlling the state law; the judges are weak enough to decide
according to the view of their legislature. An appeal to a federal
court sets all to rights.""- It is clear from Jefferson's suggestions
that he regarded the "act of confederation" or the constitution and
a treaty as the supreme law of the land, that an act of a state violat-
ing this supreme law was unconstitutional, and that the courts, not the
29Ibid., VI, 132.2°I-bid., V1, 132.
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Congress, were the proper agents to pass upon the question of con-
stitutionality because the remedy would be restricted to actual cases;
in Jefferson's words, the patch and the hole would be coextant.
Jefferson did not say specifically that an act of Congress violat-
ing the supreme law would be subject to judicial review, but the
logic of his solution of the problem of the relation of Congress to
the states would make this necessary because if judicial review
could be used only as a check on state legislatures, congressional
supremacy would result. Again, it is to be noticed that in his refer-
ence to the "act of confederation" and a "treaty" being the supreme
lawl he excludes an act of Congress. Moreover, when the fore-
fathers used the expression fundamental law or constitution, they
always meant that legislative acts were subordinate to it and could
only be law when in harmony with it, and that this distinction
would amount to the sum total of nothing unless it was enforced
by the courts. Otherwise, constitutionality would become legislative
discretion. The forefathers knew that a legislative body could be
as tyrannical as an executive. In 1789, Jefferson said: "The tryanny
of legislatures is the most formidable dread at present." 21 In con-
tending for a fundamental law for Virginia in 1782 as a means
of controlling the legislature, he said: "One hundred and seventy-
three despots would surely be as oppressive as one."
'22
It has been my purpose first to show that Jefferson was the
most persistent advocate among the forefathers of the importance
of a fundamental constitution, of the foundation of such a law
upon the sovereignty of the people, of a constitutional convention
as the proper means for establishing such a law independently of
legislative bodies, of judicial review as the necessary means for
maintaining a fundamental law, and of amendment process limit-
ing the changing of such a law to its creators-the people. Here is
the complete foundation of constitutional government. In 1824--
two years before his death, Jefferson said: "Virginia of which I am
myself a native and resident, was not only the first of the states,
but, I believe I may say, the first of the nations of the earth, which
assembled its wise men peaceably together to form a fundamental
constitution, to commit it to writing, and place it among their
archives, where every one should be free to appeal to its text."23
If Virginia was the first state in the history of man to formulate
and reduce to written form a fundamental con-stitution and Jeffer-
I'lWorks (Ford Ed.) V, 83.
"-Ibid., III, 223.
.-'Writings (Library Ed.) XVI
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son was its leader in this achievement, then he becomes the founder
of constitutional government.
The Bill of Rights
Not only was Jefferson foremost among the founding fathers
in establishing the fundamental principles of the Constitution, but
he was, primarily responsible for the addition of a Bill of Rights
guaranteeing its protection of the inalienable rights of man. He
was steeped in the philosophy of natural law which was the basis
of the American Revolution and is the basis of American constitu-
tional law. The higher law doctrine of the natural law is the
essence of a fundamental law.
"A bill of rights," he said, "is what the people are entitled to
against every government on earth, general or particular; and what
no just government should refuse, or rest on inferences.12 4 "I dis-
approved from the first moment," he said, "that want of a bill of
rights (in the new constitution), to guard liberty against the legis-
lative as well as the executive branches of the government; that is
to say, to secure freedom in religion, freedom of the press, freedom
from monopolies, freedom from unlawful imprisonment, freedom
from a permanent military, and a trial by jury, in all cases deter-
minable by the laws of the land."25
He favored ratification of the Constitution by a sufficient num-
ber of states to put it into effect, but hoped that the other four
would demand a bill of rights as a basis for their ratification. "I
sincerely rejoice," he said, "at the acceptance of our Constitution
by nine states. It is a good canvas on which some strokes only
want retouching. What these are, I think are sufficiently mani-
fested by the general voice from North to South, which calls for a
bill of rights."2 6
Jefferson had great confidence in a properly constituted judi-
ciary of able and independent judges. His advocacy of judicial
review as a means of preserving the Constitution was based on this
confidence. He regarded a bill of rights as an extension of the
scope of this safeguard. In reviewing the arguments made by
Madison for a bill of rights, he said, "You omit one which has great
weight with me: the legal check 'which it puts into the hands of the
judiciary. This is a body which if rendered independent and kept
strictly to their own department, merits great confidence for their
learning and integrity. In fact, what degree of confidence would
24Works (Ford Ed.) IV, 477.
25Ibid., V, 45.2
"
6Writings (Washington Ed.) II, 445.
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be too much for a body composed of such men as Wythe, Blair,
and Pendleton? On characters like these, the 'civium ardor prava
jubentium! (the crying of a mob for the violation of law)' would
make no impression."
2
7
When Jefferson said a bill of rights would place a "legal check"
in the hands of the judiciary, he meant that the individual was
being given an extra protection for his rights by virtue of the fact
that he could appeal to the judiciary against the usurpations of the
political divisions of our governments. To him it was an additional
limitation upon political authority to be enforced by judicial review.
Here again Jefferson is the unexampled champion of the liberty of
the individual protected by a fundamental law and judicial review.
Jefferson Principles for Preserving the Constitution
It was natural and fortunate for the country that, after spend-
ing so much time, thought, and energy as well as pledging his
sacred honor and fortune for the establishing of constitutional
government, Jefferson would be jealous of its preservation. His
contribution toward preserving the Constitution was no less im-
portant than that made in its establishment.
No man ever loved the Constitution more than Jefferson. He
called it the "lex-legum"--the law of laws. He said, "our peculiar
security is in the possession of a written constitution. Let its not
make it a blank paper by construction."28 "Though written consti-
tutions may be violated in moments of passion or delusion," Jeffer-
son said, "yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful
may again rally and recall the people. They fix, too, for the people
the principles of their political creed." 29 Again, he said: "It is a
misfortune that our countrymen do not sufficiently know the value
of their constitutions and how much happier they are rendered
by them than any other people on earth by the governments under
which they live."3" "The worst of the American constitutions," he
said, "is better than the best which ever existed before in any other
country, and they are wonderfully perfect for a first essay."'"
Jefferson was truly a constitutional worshipper. He once spoke of
"the adored principles of the Constitution. 32 "The Constitution,"
he said, "is unquestionably the finest ever presented to men."si
7Ibid., 111, 3.
'-Works (Ford Ed.) VII, 247.
-o ' id., VIII, 159.
30Ibid., IV, 455.
3iIbid., IV, 403.321IBd., X, 215.
331bid., V, 80.
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Jefferson's Theory of Construction
It is now clear to all students of constitutional law that Jeffer-
son foresaw that if the Constitution was ever destroyed it would
be done by construction or interpretation, in final analysis by the
Supreme Court. Jefferson once said: "Our government is now
taking so steady a course as to show by what road it will pass to
destruction, to wit: by consolidation first, and then corruption, its
necessary consequence. The engine of consolidation will be the
federal judiciary; the two other branches the corrupting and cor-
rupted instruments. '3 4 Again, he spoke of the Federal Judiciary
as "the germ of dissolution." 35
This is why Jefferson insisted on a strict construction of the
Constitution and founded a party to perpetuate his constitutional
principles. "When an instrument admits two constructions," he
said, "the one safe, the other dangerous; the one precise, the other
indefinite, I prefer that which is safe and precise. I had rather
ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found
necessary, than to assume it by construction which would make our
powers boundless." 6 "Strained constructions," he said, "loosen
all the bands of the Constitution. '37 "If on (one) infraction (of
the constitution) we build a second, on that second a third, etc.."
he said, "any one of the powers in the Constitution may be made
to comprehend every power of government."3 8 "On every question
of construction," he said, "carry ourselves back to the time when
the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in
the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed
out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable
one in which it was passed."3 9 He believed by an historical ap-
proach and by a consultation of the debates of those who framed
and ratified the Constitution its true meaning could be discovered.
If, when this was done, it was found that the powers of the govern-
ment were inadequate to the needs of the nation, he favored the
use of the amendment process.
There was no place in Jefferson's theory of construction for
the adaptative philosophy announced by Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) that the constitution was "in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
84Writings (Library Ed.) XV, 341.
35Ibid., XV, 331.36Works (Ford Ed.) VIII, 247.
37Ibid., X, 81.
38Ibid., VIII, 174.
391bid., X, 230.
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to the various crises of human affairs."4 Was the Constitution to
be adapted by the Court or the amendment process? If by the
Court, then the extent or scope of the adaptation, limited only by
the discretion of the Court as Chief Justice Stone has said, could
make, and in my opinion, has made the amendment process un-
necessary so far as the fundamental powers of the national govern-
ment are involved. It might be used to change some of the purely
mechanical or structural features of our system. This means that
the Court has become the substitute for the sovereignty of the
American people in amending the Constitution and is a perma-
nent constituent convention. As Jefferson once said: "The Con-
stitution is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which
they may tzoist and shape into any form they please."4 1 It is both
interesting as well as tragic to discover Jefferson making these
charges against a Federalist Court for doing to a limited extent
what the Court now is doing without limit under the auspices of
his party.
Emphasis on the Amendment Process
Jefferson regarded the amendment process as one of the great
principles of a fundamental law and constitutional government. It
was the life-giving blood of a fundamental law and always evidence
that government rested upon "the consent of the governed."
"Happily for us," he said, "that when we find our constitutions
defective and insufficient to secure the happiness of our people,
we can assemble with all the coolness of philosophers, and set them
to rights, while every other nation on earth must have recourse to
arms to amend or to restore their constitution."' 4 2 "Whatever be
the Constitution," he said, "great care must be taken to provide a
mode of amendment, when experience or change of circumstances
shall have manifested that any part of it is unadalpted to the good of
the nation." If the amendment process "is found too difficult for
remedying the imperfection which experience develops from time
to time in an organization of the first impression, a greater facility
of amendment is certainly requisite to maintain it in a course of
action accommodated to the things and changes through which
we are ever passing."43
In contrast then with the adaptative theory of interpreting the
Constitution, Jefferson contended for a logical, natural and his-
4J(1919) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.41Writings (Library Ed.) XV, 213.
42Ibid., VI, 295.4
" Ibid., XV, 488.
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torical meaning of the Constitution consistent with the document
and in harmony with the intentions of the framers discovered
by a study of their writings and the debates of the drafting and
ratifying conventions. When this meaning proved inadequate for
the exigencies of the nation, the only constitutional means for
changing it was to consult the sovereignty of the American people
by the amendment process. He believed that when the Constitution
was changed by any other process it ceased to be a fundamental
law. Time has vindicated the validity of his contention.
Fear of Consolidation
"There is no danger I apprehend so much," he said, "as the
consolidation of our government by the noiseless, and, therefore,
unalarming instrumentality of the Supreme Court. '44 "Consolida-
tion," he said, "is but Toryism in disguise. '4 We are now told
that consolidation or centralization is liberalism. Jefferson called
it Toryism because all consolidation must end in executive power.
The Tories have always been the champions of executive power.
This was the issue between Whigs and Tories in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 in Great Britain and between Whigs and Tories
in the American Revolution of 1776. What would Jefferson think
of the championing of executive power by his political descendants?
He answered this question. "The consolidationists," he said. "may
call themselves republicans if they please, but the school of Venice,
and all of this principle, I call at once Tories. ' '4 Of course, a
Tory in 1688 in Great Britain and in 1776 in America was a
monarchist.
Jefferson once said: "I am not for transferring all the powers
of the states to the General Government and all those of that gov-
ernment to the Executive Branch. 14 7 Jefferson knew that central-
ization would convert our system into an executive type of
government with a bureaucracy as its agent necessarily exercis-
ing very largely the legislative and judicial powers of both the
nation and the states. He was the first great anti-bureaucrat in
American history.
Enphasis on Judicial Review
Jefferson knew as well as all students of constitutional law
know that the only way to prevent consolidatibn is to preserve the
44Ibid., XV, 421.45 Vorks (Ford Ed.) X, 379.
46 Ibid., X, 378
47Ibid., VII, 327.
. 276
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line of federalism and the doctrine of separation of powers. Jeffer-
son knew that judicial review had been established largely on his
suggestion to Madison in 1787 for this specific purpose. It was his
fears of the destruction of the Republic by centralization that
made him so bitter against the Court when he saw that it was
abusing the power of judicial review by the loose-construction or
adaptative theory of interpreting the Constitution always on the
side of nationalism. Such cases as Marbury z. Madison, (1803),48
McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819), 4 9 Cohens v. Virginia, (1821),50
and Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824)5 1 were cited by Jefferson as illus-
trations of this abuse of power and attempts by the Court to weaken
the principles of federalism and the separation of powers.
Jefferson's criticism of the Court has frequently been mis-
construed to mean that he was opposed to judicial review. No
greater error could be made in evaluating his constitutional prin-
ciples. He not only suggested judicial review as a principle of the
Constitution but he realized that his theory of strict construction
could be enforced only by a vigorous and extensive use of judicial
review. Strict construction meant a much higher death rate for
legislation. No historian has been able to find one word in Jeffer-
son's writings against the principle of judicial' review. He was
against the abuse of this power by the courts just as he was against
the abuse of power by either the President or the Congress. The
fact is Jefferson's objection to the Marshall Court was that it did
not hold more acts of Congress unconstitutional instead of granting
it powers by nationalistic decisions. It is sometimes forgotten that
the Marshall Court in a period of 35 years held only a part of one
act of Congress unconstitutional and this dealt with the powers of
the Court itself. Jefferson's criticism of the decision in Marbury v.
Madison (1803) was not that an act of Congress had been de-
clared unconstitutional but that the Court by way of dicta had
attempted to invade the powers of the executive and thus violate
the doctrine of separation of powers.5 2
Separation of Powers
Jefferson realized more keenly than any of his contemporaries
that the prevention of consolidation depended on preserving not
4',(1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.
41(1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
50(1821) 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. Ed. 257.
s1(1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
2See Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History,(1923) 1, 232.
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only the line of federalism but also the independence of the depart-
ments of government. "The leading principle of our Constitution,"
he said, "is the independence of the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary of one another. ' 5s "My construction of the Constitution,"
he said, "is ... that each department is truly independent of the
others, and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the mean-
ing of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action; and
especially, where it is to act ultimately and without appeal.""'
He did not regard "the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all con-
stitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy."
This quotation separated from its context has frequently been
used to prove that Jefferson was opposed to judicial review, but
Jefferson himself explained what he meant by it. He said, "If the
legislature fails to pass laws foi" a census, for paying the Judges
and other officers of government, for establishing a militia, for
naturalization as prescribed by the Constitution, or if they fail to
meet in Congress, the judges cannot issue their Mandamus to
them; if the President fails to supply the place of a judge, to
appoint other civil or military officer, to issue requisite commis-
sions, the judges cannot force him."", He regarded the pardon
power or veto power in this group of exceptions. None of these
issues is regarded today as raising a judicial question. Likewise, if
the President vetoed an act of Congress on grounds of unconstitu-
tionality, and it was passed over his veto and later brought before
the courts, Would they be under any constitutional restraint as to its
constitutionality because the President regarded it unconstitu-
tional ? May not the Congress repass as many times as it sees fit
any act previously declared unconstitutional by the courts? Has not
the Supreme Court frequently-possibly too frequently-changed
its mind on questions of constitutionality? This is what Jefferson
meant by an independent discretion in each of the three depart-
ments of government as to its powers.
Independent Judiciary
No American statesman ever stood for a greater independence
of the Judiciary than Thomas Jefferson though he believed it
should be "kept strictly to their own department."' It cannot be
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forgotten in this connection that one of the charges which he made
against Goerge III in the Declaration of Independence was: "He
had made our judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of
their offices, and the amount and payment of the salaries."
Under our Constitution, he said: "The judges should not be
dependent upon any man, or body of lnen."" "The Judges," he
said, "should have an estate for life in their offices, or in other
words, their commissions should be made during good behavior.""
"I was against writing letters to the judiciary officers," he said,
"I thought them. independent of the Executive, not subject to its
coercion, and not obliged to attend to its admonitions. ' 6 "The
Courts of Justice," he said, "exercise the sovereignty of this coun-
try, in judiciary matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither
to control nor opposition from any other branch of go-vernment."'
Jefferson's constitutional creed then was that "man should be
bound down by the chains of the Constitution"-a fundamental law
inviolate and unchangeable except by the consent of the same
sovereignty that created it--"the consent of the governed." That
its inviolate and unchangeable character was to be maintained by
judicial review and that immortality was to be given it by the
amendment process. "The real friends of the Constitution in its
federal form," he said, "if they wish it to be immortal, should be
attentive to amendments, to make it keep pace with the advance
of the age in science and experience."8 2 If the amendment process
should prove too rigid to meet this demand, he believed that'a
"greater facility of amendment should be provided in order that the
Constitution might be "accommodated to the times and changes
through which we are ever passing." Jefferson never felt, however,
that the Constitution was merely "a restricted railroad ticket good
for this day and train only,""2 and, therefore, should be changed
every Monday by a life-time constituent convention determined
upon converting a limited constitutional federal system of govern-
ment into a unitary authoritarian state as the agent of liberalism.
In conclusion it is submitted that if Jefferson's creed had been
followed, we would have had not only an immortal Jefferson but an
immortal constitution.
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